Bankruptcy—Partnership—Claims by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 11 Issue 2 
January 1926 
Bankruptcy—Partnership—Claims 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bankruptcy—Partnership—Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 146 (1926). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol11/iss2/9 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
BANKRUPTCY-PARTNERSHIP-CLAIMS.-In re R. P.
Brown and Co. et al., District Court, W. D., July 29, 1925.
R. P. Brown and Co., a partnership composed of R. P. Brown
and J. D. A. Smith, was declared bankrupt under an involuntary pro-
ceeding brought by the Glover Grocery Co., Sheffield Co., and Waxel-
baum & Bro., Inc. Both partners as well as the firm, were adjudf-
cated bankrupts. The Grocery Co. claimed to be creditors in the
amount of $4,265, a balance remaining unpaid on certain promissory
notes; the Sheffield claim was of the same nature, in amount $541,
and Waxelbaum and Bro. claimed as creditors to the extent of $185.
All of the notes in question read "We promise to pay," and were
signed by the partners as individuals, without mention of the firm
name. The issue is based on the contention of the creditors named
that they have a right to participate in the individual assets, although
admitting that the notes were for goods furnished the partnership.
Certain other individual creditors contest this alleged right of the
claimants. Held: Notes signed by members of a partnership in their
individual names, may, as here, support a claim in bankruptcy against
the partnership. But, as in this case, where it is an admitted or
proven fact that the notes in question were given for partnership obli-
gations, creditors cannot also prove against the individual estates of
partners.
It appears well settled that a note signed individually by a part-
ner, but in fact for a firm obligation, constitutes a valid contract of
the partnership. Davis v. Turner, 120 Fed. 605; In re Weisenberg &
Co., 131 Fed. 517; Mack v. Stoddard, 177 Fed. 611; Adams v. Lunt-
ber Co., 202 Fed. 48; In re Kendrick & Co., 226 Fed. 978.
Such a holding seems logical, and no more than would be
expected in Equity or Bankruptcy, both of which look to the substance
of the transaction rather than the form alone. In good conscience
such courts cannot reasonably resort to a fiction or implication to give
to an obligation a character other than its admittedly real one.
But a further issue is presented. By the cases supra, one con-
tract was created, viz., between the creditors and the partnership.
Can another, between creditor and individuals, be read into the same
note?
A partner may render himself individually liable by reason of
being a member of the partnership. He may become a surety, or
guaranty. Often a partnership obligation states that "We and each
of us promise to pay." Two or more contracts follow as a result, and
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a partnership creditor may participate in firm assets, the individual
creditor in individual assets.
An excellent discussion is contained in Robinson v. Seaboard
National Bank, 247 Fed. 667, referred to in the principal case, and in
10 A. L. R. 842. In the Robinson case it is said: "This is not a case
of double proof on a single contract, but of single proof of two sepa-
rate contracts." These separate contracts may be embodied in one
note.
The present case, however, is to be distinguished as concerning
notes appearing to be nothing more than individual obligations of two
men. Evidence debors the instruments proves otherwise. In Schall v.
Cators, 250 Fed. 6, the court draws a clear distinction between the
liability of the firm entity and the individuals composing it. From
the principal case it appears that in the administration of bankruptcy
this distinction is carefully followed. Partnership assets must be de-
voted to the satisfaction of partnership debts before the creditors of
the individuals can share therein. The reverse of the rule is likewise
carefully followed. See 10 A. L. R. 846.
The real character of the transaction was not here in issue. The
claims in question were exclusively firm obligations, and no separate
contracts of pruaranty are mentioned as a basis for individual claims.
There is no showing of any benefit to the individual as such. While
the decision is apparently in conflict with what would be expected
from the face of each note considered alone, it is but another of the
many cases where a court of conscience looks to the substance behind
the form. R. B. T., '27.
CARRIERS-RAILROADS-Helena Southwestern Railroad Co. v.
Coolidge. Supreme Court of Arkansas (October 19, 1925), 275
S. W. 896.
Plaintiff brought suit for damages to his alfalfa field which was
caused by snarks from one of the defendant's engines. According to
Section 8569 of the Arkansas Statutes railroads are liable if common
carriers for property damage resulting from the operation of their
trains. The defendant railroad was duly incorporated under the Ar-
kansas Statutes, but denied its liability due to the fact that its small
trackage was exclusively used to haul lumber from a planing mill to
the tracks of the Missouri Pacific Railroad. Held: "When the de-
fendant was organized as a railroad company . . . it became a
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